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CHAPTER 12

Obstacles to pH1N1 Vaccine Availability
The Complex Contracting Relationship between
Vaccine Manufacturers, the World Health
Organization, and Donor and Beneficiary
Governments
Sam F. Halabi

Introduction
When researchers in Mexico and the United States concluded that
influenza-related hospitalizations in separate, noncontiguous areas of Mexico,
southern California, and New York City uniquely affected children and young
adults, they were alerted to the possibility that a new pandemic viral subtype
of influenza had emerged (Cordova-Villalobos et al., 2009; see also Chapter 2).
After the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) received
samples from two early H1N1 patients in mid April, 2009, researchers exposed
banked blood samples taken before and after vaccinations from 2005 to the
new virus (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009). Samples from
children produced no antibodies whereas samples from adults vaccinated
against seasonal flu showed a slight increase in antibodies against the pH1N1
virus. Because it did not appear that the seasonal vaccine would adequately protect adults against infection, the CDC recommended development of a vaccine
specific to the new strain (Hancock et al., 2009). This recommendation was
echoed in the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) June 11, 2009, declaration
of a Phase 6 pandemic. Under WHO classificatory scheme operating in 2009
(it has been revised in light of the H1N1 experience), in Phases 1 through 3 of
a pandemic, influenza circulates predominantly in animals and there are few
human infections. In Phase 4, there is sustained human-to-human transmission, and in Phases 5 and 6, sustained human transmission spreads to at least
two WHO regions (Doshi, 2011).
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The CDC’s recommendation and WHO’s declaration triggered a race by
a small number of vaccine manufacturers to develop and then put into production a pandemic-specific vaccine because a market had instantaneously
developed and some manufacturers already had in place agreements with governments that required them to shift to pandemic vaccine production (Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012; World Health Organization, 2011).
Aside from the governments that had already put procurement policies and
contracts in place, the vast majority of the world’s governments and the populations they represented lacked access to vaccines and looked to WHO to work
with firms and potential donor governments to facilitate access. The gene
sequence of wild-type pandemic pH1N1 was made publicly available April 27,
2009. By May 8, 2009, samples of wild-type virus had been sent from reference laboratories to vaccine manufacturers, all of which were in Europe and
the United States, because they had the necessary high-level biological containment facilities. This chapter analyzes the obstacles standing between WHO,
vaccine manufacturers, and the populations who needed the vaccines they
produced.
Vaccines are the first line of defense against influenza to prevent infection and to control spread of the disease because they are more effective and
burden society less than nonpharmaceutical measures like masks, closing of
public gathering places, and isolation of patients (Aledort et al., 2007; Carter
and Plosker, 2008). The process by which a vaccine is first developed in a
laboratory to its administration to a population engages the full range of governmental health agencies, community organizations, pharmaceutical firms,
and international organizations that comprise the system the U.S. National
Health Security Strategy sets at the core of improving public health emergency
response.
Although recent pandemic influenza threats have originated in middle- or
low-income countries, the capacity for pandemic influenza vaccine production is overwhelmingly concentrated in Australia, Europe, and North America
(Crosse, 2008). These regions’ pharmaceutical firms are in a persistent cycle of
seasonal influenza vaccine production, which is based on surveillance reports
detailing which influenza viruses are in circulation, how they are spreading,
and how well the previous season’s vaccine viruses protect against new strains.
Although WHO recommends specific vaccine viruses after information is
gathered from more than 100 national influenza centers in more than 100
countries, individual countries make their own decisions about licensing of
vaccines subject to their own regulatory mechanisms.
When a new influenza strain emerges, the first step in vaccine response
is to assess whether the seasonal influenza vaccine will produce adequate
immunity to protect against the new strain. After researchers concluded the
seasonal vaccine did not protect against pH1N1, pharmaceutical firms, five
of which control approximately 80% of the influenza vaccine market, found
themselves negotiating with WHO about conditions for donation, shipment,
and distribution of vaccine. Governments with preexisting contracts sought
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to preserve as much of their firms’ capacity—that is, firms located within the
territorial borders of the procuring governments—as necessary to inoculate
their populations first before giving or selling to others. As a result, manufacturers negotiated with a much larger than usual number of procurement
officials, regulators, health-care providers, and vaccine distributors (Hanquet
et al., 2011).
From the manufacturers’ perspective, these negotiations occurred in the
shadow of potentially large liabilities related to their existing contractual
arrangements with governments; detailed processes for vaccine approval, distribution, and marketing; and more general exposure should quickly developed
vaccines generate unexpected adverse reactions or safety problems. Indeed,
WHO prequalified some vaccines in as little as one day, even when ongoing
studies showed significant adverse events (World Health Organization, 2010).
Manufacturers were required to seek approval as if it were an entirely new
vaccine. Under typical regimes, manufacturers must modify the new virus
to grow efficiently (generally in eggs) so it may be used for vaccine production. This modification also ensures the vaccine virus may be handled safely.
To develop antigens and injectable antiserum to measure vaccine potency,
manufacturers must coordinate with reference laboratories and regulatory
agencies. Vaccines must then be tested in human trials to assess safety and
effectiveness. Regulatory approval for marketing and use is dependent on
laboratory-generated evidence and clinical trial outcomes. Even safe and effective vaccines generate adverse events among those inoculated, ranging from
(common) soreness at the injection site to fever, discomfort, and muscle pain to
(rare) anaphylaxis and oculorespiratory syndrome (World Health Organization,
2012). One of the vaccines produced specifically for pH1N1 by GlaxoSmithKline
has been associated with an increased risk of narcolepsy (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2013). In many jurisdictions, manufacturers bear legal
responsibility for these adverse events.
Manufacturers therefore face a range of legal barriers to production, donation, and discounted sale of pandemic vaccines like the process by which vaccines may be approved and registered with national regulatory authorities,
protection from and indemnification for liability, and preexisting advance
market commitment agreements that affect the ability to enter into additional
contracts after a pandemic has been declared. In short, the global public health
response is dependent on private-sector actors who must balance private-sector
and public-sector demands on their resources.

Methods
Contracts between private parties are rarely available for public scrutiny unless
litigation exposes them. Similarly, agreements between private-sector actors
and public authorities are kept confidential in most circumstances unless they
are specifically covered by open records laws, the bidding process for them
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requires a high degree of transparency, or private-sector actors themselves
make some or all of the agreements available. Confidentiality of agreements is
particularly important when the agreement potentially affects national defense
or security—circumstances that generally characterize governmental strategies for dealing with pandemics.
However, many aspects of the relationships between vaccine manufacturers, WHO, and donor and beneficiary governments have been revealed
through testimonies before legislative bodies, postpandemic analyses undertaken by WHO, including a comprehensive assessment of its response, and
conversations and interviews with persons representing governments, firms,
and WHO. These primary sources were supplemented by analyses of the
2009 pH1N1 vaccine development and distribution problem published in the
academic literature to develop as comprehensive picture as possible of vaccine
contracting obstacles.
This document review was also supplemented by informal interviews
with decision makers, many of whom did not have time for extensive, formal
interviews. The data collected from the academic literature, WHO reports,
and interviews were organized according to major legal obstacles, which
were then vetted with public health researchers, practitioners, governmental
officials, and one representative from a vaccine manufacturer to maximize
the chance that all key issues were captured and no critical concerns were
excluded. Although these methods cannot tell us the frequency with which
specific issues arose, they are sufficient to ensure the major contracting obstacles facing manufacturers, governments, and WHO have been identified and
explored.
Other issues also affected vaccine distribution, including supply line
breaks, and inconsistencies and inadequate infrastructure to distribute vaccines once the legal uncertainties just described were resolved (see, for example, Chapter 10), but are beyond the scope of this chapter. Those problems
included the availability and resilience of cold chain packaging, shelf-life, and
planning within both public-sector actors such as the United Nations’ (UN)
Office for Project Services, UNICEF, and development agencies, along with
private-sector actors like global logistics firms.

Results
The Legal Framework for pH1N1 Pandemic
Influenza Vaccine Distribution
Development, approval, and distribution of the 2009 pH1N1 vaccine was
shaped by preexisting frameworks that had been established to address the
outbreak of H5N1 avian flu in Southeast Asia (McConnell, 2010). That subtype
spread quickly around the globe but did not (and has not to date) evolved to
become easily transmissible to humans. The concern that H5N1 may become
easily transmissible to and then between humans resulted in both divergent
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(if accelerated) regulatory approval processes, and a set of agreements entered
into between two manufacturers—GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Sanofi Pasteur
(Sanofi)—and the WHO donations of antivirals and prepandemic H5N1 vaccine doses. After the pN1H1 influenza strain was identified, WHO immediately
began negotiations with “all known” influenza vaccine manufacturers (World
Health Organization, 2011). Those discussions were shaped by planning for
H5N1 (Hanquet et al., 2011).
When the WHO declared a Phase 6 pandemic, GSK and Sanofi pledged
50 million and 60 million doses of H5N1 vaccine, respectively, although no
legal agreements for donations were in place. GSK and Sanofi agreed to convert
those commitments to pandemic influenza A pH1N1 vaccine and to increase
the number of doses to 150 million. GSK and WHO signed an agreement
for the donations on November 10, 2009, which resulted in just over 24 million doses actually donated. Sanofi announced a “flexible” donation of up to
100 million doses on June 17, 2009, but the donation agreement was not signed
until December 2009. Novartis specifically eschewed donations, favoring pricing mechanisms to establish a “sustainable way” to deliver vaccine to developing countries.
Despite the small number of players, negotiations regarding all aspects
of procurement were difficult and protracted, revealing a near-total lack of
planning to move vaccine from the private-sector developers and manufacturers to the populations that needed them. Negotiations involved at least
four manufacturers and 12 governments on the donor side, and nearly 100
governments on the beneficiary side (World Health Organization, 2011).
WHO’s negotiation with GSK served as a template for agreements with
CSL Australia, MedImmune, and Sanofi, which concluded in December
2009. Novartis signed an agreement in January 2010, although a 2011 WHO
assessment of its response to the pandemic strongly suggests the Novartis
agreement differed from the other four. Legal agreements with governments followed those with firms: the United States (December 16, 2009),
Australia (December 22, 2009), France (January 15, 2010), Belgium (January
29, 2010), Switzerland (March 16, 2010), Norway (March 19, 2010), Italy
(April 16, 2010), the United Kingdom (May 28, 2010), and Singapore (June
21, 2010). Some states perceived that WHO “shopped” different agreements
with different legal terms to different governments—a practice that generated suspicion among the donor governments and caused further delay in
finalizing terms.
The delay in placing agreements between firms, governments, and WHO
was attributable to at least two causes. First, both firms and governments
had entered into advance purchase agreements that constrained the ability
of firms to donate or otherwise provide vaccines to WHO or governments
directly. Second, vaccine manufacturers insisted on strong protections from
liability should the pandemic influenza vaccine result in adverse health events
in populations, and coverage for interests affected by specific title transfer
arrangements.
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Advance Purchase Agreements and Territorial Restraints
Long before WHO declared a pandemic, many countries, including Belgium,
Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the
United States, and the United Kingdom, had already placed large orders of
pH1N1 vaccine or had advanced agreements in place (Doshi and Jefferson,
2010). With advance purchase agreements (also known as sleeping contracts), a
vaccine manufacturer agrees to supply its pandemic influenza vaccine as soon
as possible after a pandemic has been declared and agrees to reserve a specified
number of doses for the country or to more openly meet that country’s orders
first. When it commenced negotiations with manufacturers, WHO did not
know about key aspects of the agreements. When asked whether they would
be willing to reserve (not donate) 10% of real-time production for purchase
by UN agencies, many vaccine manufacturers cited advance purchase agreements with high-income countries as a barrier. Contracting states noted the
relatively inflexible terms of those agreements. A review of European Union
member states’ vaccine planning strategies after the pandemic highlighted the
obstacles advanced purchase agreements pose:
From the contracting country’s perspective, it is clear that maximizing not
only guaranteed access to vaccine, but also increased flexibility that can help
to minimize costs and better calibrate orders to changing prognoses regarding
the ongoing development of the pandemic. Convincing vaccine [manufacturers]
to provide such flexibility is likely to pose a challenge and might well require
finding ways of enhancing the negotiating power of contracting Member States.
A forum for discussions among Member States of how to develop advance purchase contracts could be useful. (European Commission (2010)

Even aside from advance purchase agreements, the decision to dedicate
physical infrastructure and human resources to pandemic influenza vaccine production is, from the manufacturers’ view, a business decision. In a
2010 WHO report examining operational successes and failures of WHO
Deployment Initiative (the umbrella term WHO used to describe its effort to
procure vaccines from firms and governments, and to distribute them to needy
countries), pharmaceutical firms noted that “support for WHO Deployment
Initiative may have disrupted business in other areas and reduced their competitive strength” (World Health Organization, 2010, p. 9). Vaccine manufacturers, therefore, desire stockpiling agreements as a solution to business
uncertainty, whereas procuring governments demand flexibility to fit the
severity of the pandemic. The 2009 pH1N1 influenza pandemic has exacerbated this tension between firms and the governments wealthy enough to procure advanced vaccine production, and therefore what is left for populations in
lesser developed or middle-income states. After the pH1N1 threat diminished,
many more governments entered into advance purchase agreements with a
wider divergence in legal terms for a larger number of doses of pandemic or
prepandemic vaccine.
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In addition to and accompanying advance purchase agreements, domestic
law may nevertheless constrain the production and shipment environment
of vaccine manufacturers. For example, GSK’s facility in Sainte Foy, Quebec,
must fill Canada’s orders first before supplying to others, and Canada awarded
its pandemic influenza vaccine contract to a Canadian company precisely
because it feared foreign governments would restrict exports of vaccine doses
(Fidler, 2010; Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Parliament of
Canada, 2010). The Australian government made it clear to the Australian
manufacturer CSL that it must fulfill the government’s domestic needs before
exporting pH1N1 vaccine (Fidler, 2010). Despite clear acknowledgment that the
2009 outbreak originated in Mexico and leveled its most significant toll there,
Mexico had “a terrifically difficult time getting access to the pandemic vaccine”
as a result of the difficulties in assessing needs and distributing vaccines to
target populations across the globe (Halabi, 2014, p. 148).

Regulatory Approval and Legal Liabilities
Each country’s national regulatory authority responding to the pandemic
imposed its own regulatory process for approving pH1N1 vaccines, authorizing their importation, and overseeing their distribution (World Health
Organization, 2010). These processes ranged from one-time waivers of normal
rules to detailed requirements for pediatric subgroup data, regulatory assessments capacity, quality control preparedness and capacity, and postmarketing safety surveillance and field assessment of efficacy and immunogenicity.
Some regulatory agencies approved pandemic vaccines as a type of seasonal
influenza vaccine, whereas others adapted an approval process in place for candidate H5N1 (avian flu) vaccines. The biochemistry of pH1N1 vaccines varied
widely, with adjuvanted vaccines (an adjuvant is an inorganic or organic chemical, macromolecule, or entire cell of certain killed bacteria that enhance the
immune response to an antigen) and vaccines produced using cell- rather than
egg-based technology facing more significant regulatory review. In more than
half the beneficiary countries, prequalification of a vaccine by WHO was not
sufficient to obtain regulatory approval, and relatively few countries’ national
laws stated that products donated by the UN did not require national registration (World Health Organization, 2010).
These requirements, in turn, adversely affected efficacious donation and
distribution. Even when a manufacturer agreed in principle to donate to WHO
or other UN agencies (e.g., UNICEF), it might not agree to do so if the vaccine
would be distributed in a country where that vaccine is not licensed (Crosse,
2008). Since at least 2006, industry representatives have stated that manufacturers would need advance assurance that governments would provide liability
protection in order to donate vaccines. Indeed, some manufacturers will not
even authorize use of the vaccine for clinical trials if not insured against legal
liabilities. Because the initial urgency of the pandemic response required an
unprecedented number of doses of a new vaccine to be deployed globally in
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a period of only a few months, vaccine manufacturers required that all purchasers or recipients (many of which were European and North American governments) indemnify them for adverse events resulting from the use of the
pandemic H1N1 vaccine, with exceptions allowed for failure to follow current
good manufacturing processes or other discrete specifications.
Manufacturers required access to information on country regulatory processes that was often difficult to obtain. Reallocating products after this work
had begun led to additional work for manufacturers and delayed delivery to
countries (World Health Organization, 2010). In one instance, a change in the
delivery schedule necessitated switching to the product of a different manufacturer, which triggered a de novo review of all aspects of vaccine approval
(World Health Organization, 2010). The delays caused by this legal wrangling were substantial. For countries in WHO’s African region, vaccines were
deployed, on average, 261 days after a country expressed interest in donated
vaccine (World Health Organization, 2010). Legal issues surrounding both
title and transfer between manufacturers, governments, and beneficiary countries added to the delay (World Health Organization, 2010). “For those countries that were first hit by the emerging pandemic, like those in the Southern
Hemisphere, but also for some countries in the Northern Hemisphere, the
vaccines clearly came too late and well after the pandemic struck” (Osterhaus
et al., 2011, p. 2769).
The complexity of this contracting universe explains, in part, discrepancies
in pledged versus contractually committed vaccines. Availability of supply and
differing appreciation of available safety and efficacy data influenced where and
under what circumstances certain vaccines could be deployed to certain countries (Luetiegn, 2011). By the end of WHO Deployment Initiative in September
2010, 200 million doses of pandemic influenza A (pH1N1) 2009 vaccine had
been pledged for donation, but only 122.5 million doses had been committed
contractually. In total, 78 million doses of pandemic influenza A (pH1N1) 2009
were deployed to 77 countries.

Implications for Policy and Practice
Although vaccines are the first line of defense to prevent infection and to control spread of pandemic influenza, the capability to develop and manufacture
vaccine is almost entirely under the control of a small number of large pharmaceutical firms whose ability and willingness to respond to a pandemic are
fundamentally intertwined with their regulatory and contractual relationships.
If a seasonal vaccine is inadequate against a new pandemic influenza strain,
which occurred with pH1N1, manufacturers must modify the new virus, coordinate with reference laboratories and regulatory agencies, conduct human
trials, and decide whether, and to what extent, to switch seasonal vaccine
production to pandemic vaccine production. In 2009, some agreements in
place between firms and governments effectively forced this choice (Hanquet
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et al., 2011). Vaccines must then be tested in human trials to assess safety and
effectiveness. Regulatory approval for marketing and use is dependent on
laboratory-generated evidence and clinical trial outcomes. Even safe and effective vaccines generate adverse events among those inoculated, and in many
jurisdictions manufacturers bear legal responsibility for these adverse events
(Swendiman and Jones, 2009).
Each of these aspects of the vaccine development process generated contracting obstacles when WHO and individual governments approached firms
with requests for vaccine donation or purchase. Manufacturers faced differing
regulatory and approval processes, uncertain protection from legal liabilities,
constraints imposed by advance purchase agreements in place with mostly
European and North American countries, and equally uncertain and undeveloped systems for distribution even if they could manufacture a limitless number of doses. In short, the global public health response to pandemic influenza
in 2009 was dependent on private-sector actors who, under the circumstances
then prevailing, demanded both legal assurances and relief from legal requirements in order to participate fully in that response. There were few effective
mechanisms for dealing with that reality. An effective global strategy for the
next influenza pandemic will require the identification of these contracting
and regulatory obstacles, anticipation of new ones, and the creation of ex ante
agreements and negotiation for that may facilitate vaccine development and
distribution.
Although efforts are underway to increase vaccine manufacturing capacity
in developing states, the capability remains overwhelmingly centered in large
pharmaceutical firms located in Australia, Japan, Europe, and North America.
There is a substantial consensus that capacity for vaccine production is tiny
compared with the number of doses required in the event of the next pandemic. WHO, as well as North American and European governments, are
funding programs to increase the supply of seasonal and pandemic influenza
vaccines by expanding global coverage of seasonal flu vaccine, promoting new
development sites (including in developing states), and enhancing research
and development for novel influenza vaccines (Condon and Tapen, 2010).
WHO is optimistic the agreements put in place between donor governments and firms between November 2009 and March 2010 will provide a
time-saving legal framework for production and distribution of vaccine or
other medicines during the next pandemic (World Health Organization,
2010). However, there are reasons to doubt this will be the case based on systemwide response changes. For example, one of the controversial aspects of
vaccine development and distribution between 2009 and 2010 was WHO’s
criteria for identifying a pandemic. Those criteria were based in some measure on geographic spread rather than severity. WHO has agreed to revise
these criteria so that the next time it declares a pandemic, the declaration
will reflect a more severe public health event on a widespread scale—a scenario likely to render existing legal agreements less applicable than WHO now
hopes (Doshi, 2011).
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As far as the 2009 pH1N1 experience goes, building capacity without a consistently updated framework for efficiently moving pandemic vaccine from the
private sector to the public sphere may simply aggravate the legal and regulatory bottlenecks experienced between 2009 and 2010. The expansion of
capacity in middle-income or developing countries enhances the contracting
complexity that will likely be faced during the next pandemic. No agreements
were reached with firms that are not members of the International Federation
of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations, which does not include the
small but growing number of manufacturers in developing countries. For the
most part, vaccine manufacturers and major purchasers still decide whether
to suspend seasonal influenza vaccine production so that all production capacity can be used for pandemic vaccine. Manufacturers also decide whether
production of pandemic vaccine can be safely scaled down or suspended in
favor of seasonal vaccine. Advance agreements should exist between industry,
WHO, and countries regarding these decisions or should at least create ongoing forums that keep relevant stakeholders current on a regular basis on how
vaccine manufacturers’ commitments affect overall capacity for production in
the case of a pandemic.
Approval processes for national regulatory authorities created a major obstacle not just for initial agreements to donate, but also for logistical practicalities
that favored deployment of pandemic vaccines as quickly as possible to countries that needed them as soon as possible. As with the vaccine framework
developed for H1N1, regulatory harmonization has been shaped by pre-2009
preparations for emergence of a pandemic H5N1 influenza virus strain. WHO,
in collaboration with health authorities from Canada, Japan, Spain, and the
United States, convened three technical workshops between 2006 and 2007
to examine regulatory harmonization, but the results are shaped by detailed
examination of countries with clear regulatory mandates and at least one major
vaccine manufacturer. The 2009 H1N1 pandemic has not resulted in a measurable increase in agreements between national regulatory authorities or with
WHO on data sharing, mutual recognition, of some or all aspects of vaccine
approval.
Moreover, the difficulty lesser developed and middle-income countries
experienced in obtaining pandemic H1N1 vaccine exacerbated already existing tensions over the process of developing medicines and vaccines (which
frequently involves the use of flu samples obtained in developing countries)
and making them available at affordable prices. In 2007, Indonesia withheld
samples of influenza A (H5N1) from WHO, arguing that developing countries typically shared such samples for free only to have North American and
European firms patent derivative medicines and vaccines for sale in richer
states, out of reach (in financial and other terms) from developing countries.
In response, WHO and the World Health Assembly adopted the Pandemic
Influenza Preparedness Framework, under which member states and vaccine
manufacturers have agreed on a standard material transfer agreement that
regulates the terms under which countries agree to donate influenza samples,
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the entities authorized to receive and research them, and the corresponding
sharing of resulting vaccines and other intellectual properties (Halabi, 2014).
WHO is currently negotiating with six vaccine manufacturers based on the
standard material transfer agreement, with one agreement concluded with
GSK. These agreements provide several options to manufacturers regarding
the contributions they must make in exchange for virus access. Some of these
options involve pandemic vaccine donation, while others involve antiviral donations, and still others authorize licensing of intellectual property to developing
country manufacturers. These agreements, especially the options manufacturers choose, must coexist with the advance purchase agreements and, presumably, liability issues outlined above. Together with the proliferation of advance
purchase agreements and the unknown extent of vaccine stockpiling agreements, the commitments made by manufacturers under WHO’s Pandemic
Influenza Preparedness Framework may render the legal framework used in
2009 obsolete.
Vaccines are the front line in the global response to the next pandemic
influenza outbreak, and thus their manufacturers—together with public
health agencies—form a critical public–private partnership. The seasonal–
pandemic influenza vaccine production balance; the process by which vaccines are developed, researched, and approved for use by regulatory agencies;
the potential liability manufacturers face; and the contractual limitations
imposed by advance purchase agreements all portend potential delays for the
necessary global health response. WHO has already noted that advance agreements between itself, countries, and industries should be negotiated without
regard to virus subtype for a specified period of time (e.g., three to five years)
and should be regularly reviewed and renewed. Countries that receive donated
vaccine, as any purchaser of the vaccine, should adhere to the same practices
of releasing and indemnifying manufacturers from certain legal liabilities.
Whether donated or purchased, vaccine manufacturers have emphasized
that liability protection is a crucial part of their participation in the broader
response to pandemic influenza (International Federation of Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers and Associations, 2006). As WHO’s Final Report on the
functioning of the International Health Regulations in relation to the 2009
A(PH1N1) pandemic noted:
Despite the ultimate deployment of 78 million doses of pandemic influenza
vaccine to 77 countries, numerous systemic difficulties impeded the timely
distribution of donated vaccines. Among the key difficulties was a variation in
willingness to donate, concerns about liability, complex negotiations over legal
agreements, lack of procedures to bypass national regulatory requirements and
limited national and local capacities to transport, store and administer vaccines.
Some beneficiary countries felt WHO did not adequately explain that liability
provisions included in the beneficiary agreement were the same as the liability provisions accepted by purchasing countries. All these difficulties proved
daunting in the midst of a pandemic; some could have been reduced by more
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concerted preparation and advance arrangements among all interested parties. (Available online at http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA64/
A64_10-en.pdf?ua=1, p. 133)
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